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THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGN-
MENT: A MACRO- AND MICROLEVEL PERSPEC-
TIVE. By John B. Gates.1 Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 
1992. Pp. xvii, 253. Cloth, $55.00. 
Frank J. Sorauj2 
The search for order, even meaning, in American political his-
tory is first of all the search for significant periods within the 205-
year span of government under the Constitution of 1787. Presiden-
tial terms serve that purpose about as well as a list of the kings and 
queens of English history-milestones along the route of history 
that tell the distance but little more. Scholars find far greater ana-
lytical power in periods of party ascendancy-periods in which vot-
ers adhere with some stability to the two major parties and in 
which, perforce, one of them, the "majority party," governs and 
puts its stamp on public policy. Even more useful analytically is the 
study of the great upheavals, the realignments, in party support 
brought about by shifts in the electorate. 
It would be hard to exaggerate the avidity with which histori-
ans and political scientists have seized on alignments and realign-
ments as the basic units of historical measurement in the last forty 
years or so. It was the maturing of sample surveys (i.e., polls) that 
sparked the explosion, since they provided for the first time reliable 
data on the party preferences of individual voters. The bibliography 
in Gates's book runs to more than fourteen pages, substantial in-
deed even though some of the entries deal with the courts per se 
rather than realignment. Harold Bass's bibliography in another re-
cent book on realignment more generally runs to a staggering 
thirty-one pages and more than 700 entries.3 Realignment is in-
deed a flourishing industry among scholars of American politics. 
Not surprisingly within so large a scholarly domain, there are 
sub-domains and tribes of specialists, each with a particular agenda 
of questions to debate. What fundamentally is the nature of the 
attachment (loyalty? identification?) of individuals to political par-
ties in a nation with no tradition of formal membership in them-
and how does one measure it? Are realignments caused by the con-
version of voters from one party to another or by the sudden infu-
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California-Davis. 
2. Regents' Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
3. Harold F. Bass, Jr., Background to Debate: A Reader's Guide and Bibliography, in 
Byron Shafer, ed., The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras 147-78 (U. 
of Wis. Press, 1991). 
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sion of new voters overwhelmingly into one of the parties? Do all 
realignments have the same dynamic and major characteristics-is 
there just one kind of realignment, fairly uniform regardless of time 
and context? And, indeed, will realignments go on "forever?" Or 
do we now see the end of realignments as party loyalties attenuate 
and as we linger in a dealignment that doesn't seem to want to pro-
gress to the next realignment? 
And then there are the questions about the relationship of 
realignments to policymaking (and policies made) in the Congress 
and the Supreme Court. Gates's book obviously falls into the latter 
category. The relationship of realignments to policymaking, how-
ever, is in fact two questions. Do the policies made in Congress and 
the Court before the realignment help to define its critical issues and 
thus to bring the realignment about? And after the realignment, 
does the Court, reflecting the majority views of the old alignment, 
inevitably find itself at odds with the Congress that is the electoral 
product of the new one? Gates tackles both questions. 
In fact, the Gates study is the most systematic and comprehen-
sive one on the realignment-Court nexus in a literature graced by 
the work, inter alia, of Robert Dahl, Richard Funston, Jonathan 
Casper and David Adamany. Certainly his data base is wider-all 
instances of Supreme Court invalidation of both state and federal 
policies in the periods both before and after the major realignments. 
For good measure Gates even treats the somewhat inconclusive 
dealignment (and, a few would argue, partial realignment) begin-
ning with the elections of 1960 and 1964. It is a net wide enough to 
catch 743 cases. To repeat, it is the inclusion of both national and 
state policies and the before and after impacts of the Court in the 
realignment that marks the broadened scope of this book. 
Gates's examination of the Supreme Court's involvement with 
the cycles of alignment and realignment in American history is sys-
tematic, rigorous and monographic. There are precious few person-
alities or anecdotes here. It is serious, empirical social science, 
although one should hasten to add that the use of numbers is re-
strained and the statistical apparatus relatively simple. Each chap-
ter--one realignment per chapter-has the same architecture, the 
same progression of topics; the reader always knows the neighbor-
hood, even if at the price of predictability. There are also many, 
perhaps even a few too many, previews and summaries to sustain 
the thread of analysis. In short, the book is intended for the serious 
reader, and while the prose is certainly not a "quick read," it is 
lucid and it requires no translation into colloquial English. 
Gates's conclusions are equivocal. In the author's words: "The 
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evidence ... does not consistently support either the policy conflict 
role following critical elections or the agenda-setting role before 
critical elections." (The "role" apparatus runs through the book 
and can, if the reader wishes, be safely ignored.) The Court's con-
tributions to realignment agendas differed in the four instances 
under study, and the Court's conflict with the elected branches after 
realignment is clear only after the realignment of 1932. It appears, 
in other words, that we have hypothesized too great a judicial in-
volvement in the politics of realignment, a result, I suspect, of infer-
ring too much from the decisions of a conservative Supreme Court 
between the two wars and the epic battle centering on the Court in 
the 1930s. 
With hindsight sharpened by work such as Gates's, it now 
seems that we have ignored a good deal we know about the Court 
and its decisionmaking in positing the Court-realignment nexus. 
(For their part, scholars of the parties have paid insufficient atten-
tion to the nonparty context within which party realignments take 
place.) Not all of the issues over which the Court has constitutional 
differences with the states and Congress become realigning issues; 
realignment has never involved all of our policy politics and differ-
ences. Moreover, the issues salient to the appointment politics of 
Justices may not be the critical issues of realignment either. And 
Justices do change their positions even on possible realigning issues; 
the shift of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter to constitu-
tional middle ground on the abortion issue reminds us of that. 
As for conflict with Congress and the President post-realign-
ment, the hypothesis of the nexus underestimates the capacity of the 
Court for change and adaptation. Have we so soon forgotten the 
1937 "switch in time" that saved nine? In such conflict within the 
separation of powers, the elected branches are not without their 
weapons, and the Justices, too, are in varying degrees sensitive to 
their anomalous position as life-long mandarins in a mass democ-
racy and, thus, variously sensitive to broad popular opinion. Nor 
are the Justices incapable of changes in their own worldviews. In 
the metered prose of one of the great sentences in American juris-
prudence-Benjamin Cardozo's famous dictum in The Nature of 
the Judicial Process-"[t]he great tides and currents which engulf 
the rest of men do not tum aside in their course and pass the judges 
by."4 
Any exploration of the relationship between basic political 
shifts in the mass American electorate and the decisions of the 
Supreme Court inevitably raises the most fundamental issues: the 
4. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (Yale U. Press, 1925). 
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nature and origin of conflict between the Court and the elected 
branches, the impact of mass and specialized opinion on the Court 
and indeed the extent of "political" decisionmaking on the Court. 
A careful reading of the Gates book will stimulate many medita-
tions on these and similar themes. To take only one example, Gates 
presents a convincing case that the partisan affiliations and auspices 
of the individual Justices are only marginally related to their voting 
on the Court. So, the addition of new data to the debate--on the 
roots of judicial decision in this case-shows us once again that re-
ality is more complex than we would prefer. 
Specialists on realignment and its various manifestations will 
find additional, more technical grist for their mills in the Gates 
book. First, on method, Gates is persuasive in arguing that the 
Court's constitutional relations with the states must be included in 
assessing the Court-realignment nexus. Changes in the policy 
agenda may be sparked and given new salience in the states as well 
as in Washington. More broadly, the more we explore realignments 
and the more we learn of their roots and dynamic, the more varied 
and complicated they seem. Realignments seemed at one time to 
combine explanatory power with a seductive parsimony. The se-
duction has been very real, but the parsimony was probably always 
illusory. 
And where does Gates leave scholarship on the nexus? Cer-
tainly he has shifted the presumption from one of validity to one of 
doubt; the final weight of the evidence and the carefully drawn con-
clusions simply can't be avoided. For the proponents of the nexus 
three options occur to me. First, they can admit defeat and give up. 
Second, they might try to recast the argument by broadening judi-
cial influence (or "role") to include patterns of policy interpretation 
as well as invalidation. But such a new conceptualization of judicial 
muscle raises the most formidable problems of measurement. (Talk 
about the loss of parsimony!) Third, they can pitch in to recon-
struct a new and more complex set of hypotheses, a set that would 
specify different judicial contributions or impacts in different re-
alignment contexts or dynamics. If we concede that not all realign-
ments are alike, that is to say that the work of the industry has 
really only begun. Stay tuned. 
